Trafficbot leverages multiple cryptographic keys to ensure artifact authenticity and supply chain provenance across the Desktop shell, the Control Server sidecar, and the distributed Worker fleet.
The Desktop client verifies updates using a Minisign Ed25519 key pair embedded in tauri.conf.json.
plugins.updater.pubkey in tauri.conf.json. Avoid copying the key into documentation, where it can become stale.TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY): Must be provided securely to GitHub Actions.TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD): Unlocks the private key for signing during CI tauri build.This key is only responsible for signing the .tar.gz and .zip archives of the Desktop application itself, preventing man-in-the-middle attacks on the Desktop update channel.
For local signing, store keys under the ignored .local/signing/ directory, with directory permissions 700 and private-key permissions 600. Existing local updater and updater.pub files have been relocated there. Never commit or upload the private key; GitHub Actions receives it through secrets. A public key in configuration does not establish that CI signing secrets or OS notarization are configured.
The Worker fleet verifies its own updates (Control Server to Worker, and GitHub Release to Worker) using an ECDSA prime256v1 key pair.
RELEASE_PUBLIC_KEY): Bundled into the worker binary or passed via environment to ReleaseManager.RELEASE_PRIVATE_KEY): Provided securely to GitHub Actions to run scripts/sign-release.cjs when publishing manifest.json.sig.This key is strictly responsible for verifying manifest.json signatures, ensuring that the worker only downloads and executes SHA-256 artifacts cryptographically signed by the Trafficbot publisher. Do not mix this up with the Tauri Minisign key.
To operate without SmartScreen and Gatekeeper warnings:
APPLE_CERTIFICATE (p12 base64) / APPLE_SIGNING_IDENTITY (Developer ID Application)APPLE_ID, APPLE_PASSWORD, APPLE_TEAM_ID (For notarization via altool or notarytool)WINDOWS_SIGNING_CERT (pfx base64 or path)WINDOWS_SIGNING_PASSWORDThese keys sign the actual OS executables (the .app bundle, .exe, and trafficbot-sidecar), asserting developer identity to the operating system itself.
We utilize actions/attest-build-provenance to issue cryptographically signed SLSA provenance attestations tied to the GitHub Actions OIDC identity. These attestations prove that the release artifacts were actually built by the .github/workflows/release-desktop.yml workflow and have not been tampered with post-build.