trafficbot

Trafficbot Release Signing & Key Inventory

Trafficbot leverages multiple cryptographic keys to ensure artifact authenticity and supply chain provenance across the Desktop shell, the Control Server sidecar, and the distributed Worker fleet.

1. Tauri Desktop Updater Keys

The Desktop client verifies updates using a Minisign Ed25519 key pair embedded in tauri.conf.json.

This key is only responsible for signing the .tar.gz and .zip archives of the Desktop application itself, preventing man-in-the-middle attacks on the Desktop update channel.

For local signing, store keys under the ignored .local/signing/ directory, with directory permissions 700 and private-key permissions 600. Existing local updater and updater.pub files have been relocated there. Never commit or upload the private key; GitHub Actions receives it through secrets. A public key in configuration does not establish that CI signing secrets or OS notarization are configured.

2. Worker Fleet ECDSA Keys

The Worker fleet verifies its own updates (Control Server to Worker, and GitHub Release to Worker) using an ECDSA prime256v1 key pair.

This key is strictly responsible for verifying manifest.json signatures, ensuring that the worker only downloads and executes SHA-256 artifacts cryptographically signed by the Trafficbot publisher. Do not mix this up with the Tauri Minisign key.

3. Desktop Application Code Signing & Notarization

To operate without SmartScreen and Gatekeeper warnings:

macOS

Windows

These keys sign the actual OS executables (the .app bundle, .exe, and trafficbot-sidecar), asserting developer identity to the operating system itself.

4. GitHub Artifact Attestations

We utilize actions/attest-build-provenance to issue cryptographically signed SLSA provenance attestations tied to the GitHub Actions OIDC identity. These attestations prove that the release artifacts were actually built by the .github/workflows/release-desktop.yml workflow and have not been tampered with post-build.